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Abstract
Understanding properties of deep neural networks is an im-
portant challenge in deep learning. In this paper, we take a
step in this direction by proposing a rigorous way of veri-
fying properties of a popular class of neural networks, Bi-
narized Neural Networks, using the well-developed means of
Boolean satisfiability. Our main contribution is a construction
that creates a representation of a binarized neural network as
a Boolean formula. Our encoding is the first exact Boolean
representation of a deep neural network. Using this encoding,
we leverage the power of modern SAT solvers along with a
proposed counterexample-guided search procedure to verify
various properties of these networks. A particular focus will
be on the critical property of robustness to adversarial pertur-
bations. For this property, our experimental results demon-
strate that our approach scales to medium-size deep neural
networks used in image classification tasks. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work on verifying properties
of deep neural networks using an exact Boolean encoding of
the network.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have become ubiquitous in machine
learning with applications ranging from computer vision to
speech recognition and natural language processing. Neu-
ral networks demonstrate excellent performance in many
practical problems, often beating specialized algorithms for
these problems, which led to their rapid adoption in in-
dustrial applications. With such a wide adoption, important
questions arise regarding our understanding of these neu-
ral networks: How robust are these networks to perturba-
tions of inputs? How critical is the choice of one archi-
tecture over the other? Does certain ordering of transfor-
mations matter? Recently, a new line of research on un-
derstanding neural networks has emerged that look into a
wide range of such questions, from interpretability of neu-
ral networks to verifying their properties (Bau et al. 2017;
Szegedy et al. 2014; Bastani et al. 2016; Huang et al. 2017;
Katz et al. 2017).
In this work we focus on an important class of neural
networks: Binarized Neural Networks (BNNs) (Hubara et
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al. 2016). These networks have a number of important fea-
tures that are useful in resource constrained environments,
like embedded devices or mobile phones. Firstly, these net-
works are memory efficient, as their parameters are primar-
ily binary. Secondly, they are computationally efficient as all
activations are binary, which enables the use of specialized
algorithms for fast binary matrix multiplication. These net-
works have been shown to achieve performance comparable
to traditional deep networks that use floating point precision
on several standard datasets (Hubara et al. 2016). Recently,
BNNs have been deployed for various embedded applica-
tions ranging from image classification (McDanel, Teerapit-
tayanon, and Kung 2017) to object detection (Kung et al.
2017).
The goal of this work is to analyze properties of bina-
rized neural networks through the lens of Boolean satisfia-
bility (SAT). Our main contribution is a procedure for con-
structing a SAT encoding of a binarized neural network.
An important feature of our encoding is that it is exact and
does not rely on any approximations to the network struc-
ture. This means that this encoding allows us to investi-
gate properties of BNNs by studying similar properties in
the SAT domain, and the mapping of these properties back
from the SAT to the neural network domain is exact. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work on verifying
properties of deep neural networks using an exact Boolean
encoding of a network. In our construction, we exploit at-
tributes of BNN’s, both functional, e.g., most parameters of
these networks are binary, and structural, e.g., the modu-
lar structure of these networks. While these encodings could
be directly handled by modern SAT solvers, we show that
one can exploit the structure of these encodings to solve
the resulting SAT formulas more efficiently based on the
idea of counterexample-guided search (Clarke et al. 2000;
McMillan 2005; McMillan 2003).
While our encoding could be used to study many proper-
ties of BNNs, in this paper we focus on important properties
of network robustness and equivalence.
1. Deep neural networks have been shown susceptible to
crafted adversarial perturbations which force misclassi-
fication of the inputs. Adversarial inputs can be used to
subvert fraud detection, malware detection, or mislead
autonomous navigation systems (Papernot et al. 2016;
Grosse et al. 2016) and pose a serious security risk (e.g.,
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consider an adversary that can fool an autonomous driv-
ing system into not following posted traffic signs). There-
fore, certifiably verifying robustness of these networks to
adversarial perturbation is a question of paramount practi-
cal importance. Using a SAT encoding, we can certifiably
establish whether or not a BNN is robust to adversarial
perturbation on a particular image.
2. Problems of verifying whether two networks are equiva-
lent in their operations regularly arise when dealing with
network alterations (such as that produced by model re-
duction operations (Reagen et al. 2017)) and input prepro-
cessing. Again, with our SAT encodings, we can check for
network equivalence or produce instances where the two
networks differ in their operation.
Experimentally, we show that our techniques can verify
properties of medium-sized BNNs. In Section 8, we present
a set of experiments on the MNIST dataset and its variants.
For example, for a BNN with five fully connected layers,
we are able to prove the absence of an adversarial perturba-
tion or find such a perturbation for up to 95% of considered
images.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. Vectors are in
column-wise fashion, denoted by boldface letters. For a vec-
tor v ∈ Rm, we use (v1, . . . , vm) to denote its m elements.
For p ≥ 1, we use ‖v‖p to denote the Lp-norm of v. For
a Boolean CNF (Conjunctive Normal Form) formula A, let
vars(A) denote the set of variables in A. We say A is un-
satisfiable if there exists no assignment to the variables in
vars(A) that evaluates the formula to true, otherwise we say
A is satisfiable. Let A and B be Boolean formulas. We de-
note A¯ the negation ofA. We say thatA impliesB (A⇒ B)
iff A¯ ∨ B is satisfiable and A is equivalent to B (A ⇔ B)
iff A⇒ B and B ⇒ A.
Next, we define the supervised image classification prob-
lem that we focus on. We are given a set of training images
drawn from an unknown distribution ν over Zn, where n
here represents the “size” of individual images. Each image
is associated with a label generated by an unknown function
L : Zn → [s], where [s] = {1, . . . , s} is a set of possible
labels. During the training phase, given a labeled training
set, the goal is to learn a neural network classifier that can
be used for inference: given a new image drawn from the
same distribution ν, the classifier should predict its true la-
bel. During the inference phase, the network is fixed. In this
work, we study properties of such fixed networks generated
post training.
Properties of Neural Networks
In this section, we define several important properties of
neural networks, ranging from robustness to properties re-
lated to network structure. As the properties defined in this
section are not specific to BNNs, we consider a general
feedforward neural network denoted by F. Let F(x) repre-
sent the output of F on input x and `x = L(x) be the ground
truth label of x. For example, x can be an image of a bus and
`x is its ground truth label, i.e. ‘bus’.
Adversarial Network Robustness. Robustness is an im-
portant property that guards the network against adversarial
tampering of its outcome by perturbing the inputs. In the past
few years, modern deep networks have been shown suscep-
tible to crafted adversarial perturbations which force mis-
classification of the inputs, especially images. Adversarial
inputs enable adversaries to subvert the expected system be-
havior leading to undesired consequences and could pose a
security risk when these systems are deployed in the real
world. There are now many techniques for generating ad-
versarial inputs, e.g., see (Szegedy et al. 2014; Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and
Frossard 2016). Therefore, a natural question is to under-
stand how susceptible a network is to any form of adver-
sarial perturbation (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015;
Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016; Bastani et al.
2016). Informally, a network is robust on an input if small
perturbations to the input does not lead to misclassification.
More formally,
Definition 1 (Adversarial Robustness1). A feedforward neu-
ral network F is (, p)-robust for an input x if there does not
exist τ , ‖τ‖p ≤ , such that F(x + τ) 6= `x.
The case of p = ∞, which bounds the maximum pertur-
bation applied to each entry in x, is especially interesting
and has been considered frequently in the literature on ad-
versarial attacks in deep learning (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2015; Bastani et al. 2016; Katz et al. 2017).
Another popular definition of robustness comes from
the notion of universal adversarial perturbation as defined
by (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2016). Intuitively, a universal
adversarial perturbation is one that leads to misclassification
on most (say, ρ-fraction) of the inputs in a set of images.
Absence of such a perturbation is captured in the following
definition of robustness. Let S denote a set of images.
Definition 2 (Universal Adversarial Robustness). A feedfor-
ward neural network F is (, p, ρ)-universally robust for a
set of inputs in S if there does not exist τ , ‖τ‖p ≤ , such
that
∑
xi∈S 1F(xi+τ)6=lxi ≥ ρ|S|.
Network Equivalence. Similar to robustness, a property
that is commonly verified is that of equivalence of networks.
Informally, two networks F1 and F2 are equivalent if these
networks generate same outputs on all inputs drawn from
the domain. Let X denote the domain from which inputs are
drawn. In the case of images, X = Zn.
Definition 3 (Network Equivalence). Two feedforward neu-
ral networks F1 and F2 are equivalent if for all x ∈ X ,
F1(x) = F2(x).
We describe two common scenarios where such equiva-
lence problem arises in practice.
1. Network Alteration: Consider a scenario where a part of
the trained network has been altered to form a new net-
work. This change could arise due to model reduction
operations that are commonly performed on deep net-
works to make them amenable for execution on resource-
constrained devices (Reagen et al. 2017) or they could
1The definition naturally extends to a collection of inputs.
arise from other sources of noise including adversarial
corruption of the network. The question now is whether
the altered network is equivalent to the original network?
2. Augmentation Reordering: Consider a scenario where an
input is preprocessed (augmented) before it is supplied to
a network. Examples of such preprocessing include geo-
metrical transformations, blurring, etc. Let f : X → X
and g : X → X be two transformation functions (this ex-
tends to more transformation functions too). We want to
know how sensitive the network is to the order of applica-
tions of f and g. For example, given a network F, let F1 be
the network that applies f ◦ g on the input followed by F,
and F2 be the network that applies g ◦ f on the input fol-
lowed by F. The question now is whether F1 is equivalent
to F2?
3 Binarized Neural Networks
A binarized neural network (BNN) is a feedforward net-
work where weights and activations are predominantly bi-
nary (Hubara et al. 2016). It is convenient to describe the
structure of a BNN in terms of composition of blocks of
layers rather than individual layers. Each block consists of
a collection of linear and non-linear transformations. Blocks
are assembled sequentially to form a BNN.
Internal Block. Each internal block (denoted as BLK) in a
BNN performs a collection of transformations over a binary
input vector and outputs a binary vector. While the input and
output of a BLK are binary vectors, the internal layers of
BLK can produce real-valued intermediate outputs. A com-
mon construction of an internal BLK (taken from (Hubara
et al. 2016)) is composed of three main operations:2 a lin-
ear transformation (LIN), batch normalization (BN), and bi-
narization (BIN). Table 1 presents the formal definition of
these transformations. The first step is a linear (affine) trans-
formation of the input vector. The linear transformation can
be based on a fully connected layer or a convolutional layer.
The linear transformation is followed by a scaling which is
performed with a batch normalization operation (Ioffe and
Szegedy 2015). Finally, a binarization is performed using
the sign function to obtain a binary output vector.3 Figure 1
shows two BLKs connected sequentially.
Output Block. The output block (denoted as O) produces
the classification decision for a given image. It consists of
two layers (see Table 1). The first layer applies a linear
(affine) transformation that maps its input to a vector of in-
tegers, one for each output label class. This is followed by a
ARGMAX layer, which outputs the index of the largest entry
in this vector as the predicted label.
Network of Blocks. BNN is a deep feedforward net-
work formed by assembling a sequence of internal blocks
2In the training phase, there is an additional hard tanh layer
after batch normalization layer that is omitted in the inference
phase (Hubara et al. 2016).
3A BLK may also contain a max pooling operation to perform
dimensionality reduction, which can be simulated using a convo-
lutional layer with an appropriately chosen stride (Springenberg et
al. 2015).
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Figure 1: A schematic view of a binarized neural network.
The internal blocks also have an additional hard tanh layer.
and an output block. Suppose we have d − 1 blocks,
BLK1, . . . ,BLKd−1 that are placed consecutively, so the
output of a block is an input to the next block in the list.
Let xk be the input to BLKk and xk+1 be its output. The
input of the first block is the input of the network. We as-
sume that the input of the network is a vector of integers,
which is true for the image classification task if images are
in the standard RGB format. Note that these integers can be
encoded with binary values {−1, 1} using a standard encod-
ing. Therefore, we keep notations uniform for all layers by
assuming that inputs are all binary. The output of the last
layer, xd ∈ {−1, 1}nd , is passed to the output block O to
obtain the label.
Definition 4 (Binarized Neural Network). A binarized neu-
ral network BNN : {−1, 1}n → [s] is a feedforward net-
work that is composed of d blocks, BLK1, . . . ,BLKd−1,O.
Formally, given an input x,
BNN(x) = O(BLKd−1(. . .BLK1(x) . . .)).
4 Encodings of Binarized Networks
In this section, we consider encodings of BNNs into
Boolean formulae. To this end, we encode the two building
blocks (BLK and O) of the network into SAT. The encoding
of the BNN is a conjunction of encodings of its blocks. Let
BINBLKk(xk,xk+1) be a Boolean function that encodes the
kth block (BLKk) with an input xk and an output xk+1. Sim-
ilarly, let BINO(xd, o) be a Boolean function that encodes O
that takes an input xd and outputs o. The entire BNN on in-
put x can be encoded as a Boolean formula (with x1 = x):(
d−1∧
k=1
BINBLKk(xk,xk+1)
)
∧ BINO(xd, o).
We consider several encodings of BINBLK and BINO start-
ing with a simple MILP encoding, which is refined to get
an ILP encoding, which is further refined to the final SAT
encoding.
Mixed Integer Linear Program Encoding
We start with a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
encoding of BLK and O blocks. Our MILP encoding has
the same flavor as other encodings in the literature for non-
binarized networks, e.g., (Bastani et al. 2016; Pulina and
Tacchella 2012) (see Section 7).
Structure of kth Internal block, BLKk : {−1, 1}nk → {−1, 1}nk+1 on input xk ∈ {−1, 1}nk
LIN y = Akxk + bk , where Ak ∈ {−1, 1}nk+1×nk and bk ∈ Rnk+1
BN zi = αki
(
yi−µki
σki
)
+ γki , where y = (y1, . . . , ynk+1), and αki , γki , µki , σki ∈ R. Assume σki > 0.
BIN xk+1 = sign(z) where z = (z1, . . . , znk+1) ∈ Rnk+1 and xk+1 ∈ {−1, 1}nk+1
Structure of Output Block, O : {−1, 1}nd → [s] on input xd ∈ {−1, 1}nd
LIN w = Adxd + bd, where Ad ∈ {−1, 1}s×nd and bd ∈ Rs
ARGMAX o = argmax(w), where o ∈ [s]
Table 1: Structure of internal and outputs blocks which stacked together form a binarized neural network. In the training phase, there might be
an additional hard tanh layer after batch normalization. Ak and bk are parameters of the LIN layer, whereas αki , γki , µki , σki are parameters
of the BN layer. The µ’s and σ’s correspond to mean and standard deviation computed in the training phase. The BIN layer is parameter free.
Encoding of BLKk. We encode each layer in BLKk to MILP
separately. Let ai be the ith row of the matrix Ak. Let xk ∈
{−1, 1}nk denote the input to BLKk.
Linear Transformation. The first layer we consider is the
linear layer (LIN). In the following, for simplicity, we fo-
cus on the linear transformation applied by a fully connected
layer but note that a similar encoding can also be done for
a convolution layer (as convolutions are also linear opera-
tions). The linear constraint in this case is simply,
yi = 〈ai,xk〉+ bi, i = 1, . . . , nk+1, (1)
where y = (y1, . . . , ynk+1) is a vector in Rnk+1 because the
bias part, b, is a vector of real values.
Batch Normalization. The second layer is the batch nor-
malization layer (BN) that takes the output of the linear layer
as an input. By definition, we have
zi = αki
(
yi − µki
σki
)
+ γki , i = 1, . . . , nk+1, or
σkizi = αkiyi − αkiµki + σkiγki , i = 1, . . . , nk+1. (2)
The above equation is a linear constraint.
Binarization. For the BIN operation, which implements a
sign function, we need to deal with conditional constraints.
zi ≥ 0⇒ vi = 1, i = 1, . . . , nk+1, (3)
zi < 0⇒ vi = −1, i = 1, . . . , nk+1. (4)
Since these constraints are implication constraints, we can
use a standard trick with the big-M formulation to en-
code them (Griva, Nash, and Sofer 2009). Define, xk+1 =
(v1, . . . , vnk+1).
Example 1. Consider an internal block with two inputs
and one output. Suppose we have the following parameters:
Ak = [1,−1], bk = [−0.5], αk = [0.12], µk = [−0.1],
σk = [2] and γk = [0.1]. First, we apply the linear transfor-
mation:
y1 = xk1 − xk2 − 0.5.
Second, we apply batch normalization:
2z1 = 0.12y1 + 0.12× 0.1 + 2× 0.1.
Finally, we apply binarization. We get z1 ≥ 0 ⇒ v1 = 1,
and z1 < 0⇒ v1 = −1. In this case, xk+1 is just v1.
Encoding of O. For the O block, encoding of the linear layer
is straightforward as in the BLK case:
wi = 〈ai,xd〉+ bi, i = 1, . . . , s,
where ai now represents the ith column in Ad and w =
(w1, . . . , ws). To encode ARGMAX, we need to encode an
ordering relation between wi’s. We assume that there is a
total order over wi’s for simplicity. We introduce a set of
Boolean variables dij’s such that
wi ≥ wj ⇔ dij = 1, i, j = 1, . . . , s.
Finally, we introduce an output variable o and use more im-
plication constraints.
s∑
j=1
dij = s⇒ o = j, i = 1, . . . , s. (5)
Example 2. Consider an output block with two inputs and
two outputs. Suppose we have the following parameters for
this block Ad = [1,−1;−1, 1] and b = [−0.5, 0.2]. First,
we perform encoding of the linear transformation. We get
constraints
w1 = xd1 − xd2 − 0.5,
w2 = −xd1 + xd2 + 0.2.
As we have only two outputs, we introduce four Boolean
variables dij , i, j = 1, 2. Note that d11 and d22 are always
true. So, we only need to consider non-diagonal variables.
Hence, we have the following constraints: w1 ≥ w2 ⇔
d12 = 1 and w2 < w1 ⇔ d21 = 1.
Finally, we compute the output o of the neural network as:
d11 + d12 = 2⇒ o = 1 and d21 + d22 = 2⇒ o = 2.
ILP Encoding
In this section, we show how we can get rid of real-valued
variables in the MILP encoding to get a pure ILP encoding
which is smaller compared to the MILP encoding.
Encoding of BLKk. As the input and the output of BLKk are
integer (binary) values, both z and y are functional variables
of xk. Hence, we can substitute them in (3) and in (4) based
on (1) and (2) respectively. We get that
αki
σki
(〈ai,xk〉+ bi)− αki
σki
µki + γki ≥ 0⇒ vi = 1.
Assume αki > 0, then this translates to
〈ai,xk〉 ≥ −σki
αki
γki + µki − bi ⇒ x′i = 1.
Consider, the left part of above equation. Now, we notice
that the left-hand of the equation (〈ai,xk〉) has an integer
value, as ai and xk are binary vectors. Hence, the right-
hand side, which is a real value can be rounded safely. Define
Ci = d− σkiαki γki +µki − bie. Then we can use the following
implication constraint to encode (3) and (4).
〈ai,xk〉 ≥ Ci ⇒ vi = 1, i = 1, . . . , nk+1, (6)
〈ai,xk〉 < Ci ⇒ vi = −1, i = 1, . . . , nk+1. (7)
If αki < 0, then the idea is again similar, but now we define
Ci = b− σkiαki γki + µki − bic, and use this value of Ci in (6)
and (7). If αki = 0, then we can eliminate these constraints
and set vi’s based on the sign of γki ’s.
Example 3. Consider the internal block from Example 1.
Following our transformation, we get the following con-
straints:
xk1 − xk2 ≥ d−2× 0.1/0.12− 0.1 + 0.5e ⇒ v1 = 1,
xk1 − xk2 < d−2× 0.1/0.12− 0.1 + 0.5e ⇒ v1 = −1.
Encoding of O. Next, we consider the output block. As with
the MILP encoding, we introduce the Boolean variables dij
but avoid using the intermediate variables wi’s. This trans-
lates to:
〈ai,xd〉+ bi ≥ 〈aj ,xd〉+ bj ⇔ dij = 1, i, j = 1, . . . , s.
where ai and aj denote the ith and jth rows in the matrix
Ad. The above constraints can be reexpressed as:
〈ai − aj ,xd〉 ≥ dbj − bie ⇔ dij = 1, i, j = 1, . . . s. (8)
The rounding is sound as Ad and xd have only integer (bi-
nary) entries. Constraints from (5) can be reused as all vari-
ables there are integers.
Example 4. Consider the output block from Example 2 and
constraints for d12 (encoding for d21 is similar). We follow
the transformation above to get:
xd1 − xd2 − 0.5 ≥ −xd1 + xd2 + 0.2⇔ d12 = 1,
which can be reexpressed as:
xd1 − xd2 ≥ d0.7/2e ⇔ d12 = 1.
SAT (CNF) Encoding
Our next step will be to go from the ILP to a pure SAT en-
coding. A trivial way to encode the BLK and O blocks into
CNF is to directly translate their ILP encoding defined above
into SAT, but this is inefficient as the resulting encoding
will be very large and the SAT formula will blow up even
with logarithmic encoding of integers. In this section, we
will further exploit properties of binarized neural networks
to construct a more compact SAT encoding. We first re-
call the definition of sequential counters from (Sinz 2005a;
Sinz 2005b) that are used to encode cardinality constraints.
Sequential Counters. Consider a cardinality constraint:∑m
i=1 li ≥ C, where li ∈ {0, 1} is a Boolean variable
and C is a constant. This can be compiled into CNF us-
ing sequential counters, that we denote as SQ(l, C) with
l = (l1, . . . , lm). Next we recall sequential counters encod-
ing.
Consider a cardinality constraint:
∑m
i=1 li ≥ C, where
li ∈ {0, 1} is a Boolean variable and C is a constant.
Then the sequential counter encoding, that we denote as
SQ(l, C) with l = (l1, . . . , lm), can be written as the fol-
lowing Boolean formula:
(l1 ⇔ r(1,1)) ∧ (r¯(1,j), j ∈ {2, . . . , C}) ∧
r(i,1) ⇔ li ∨ r(i−1,1) ∧
r(i,j) ⇔ li ∧ r(i−1,j−1) ∨ r(i−1,j), j ∈ {2, . . . , C}, (9)
where i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Essentially, this encoding computes
the cumulative sums
∑p
i=1 li and the computation is per-
formed in unary, i.e., the Boolean variable r(j,p) is true iff∑j
i=1 li ≥ p. In particular, r(m,C) encodes whether
∑m
i=1 li
is greater than or equal to C.
Encoding of BLKk. Looking at the constraint in (6) (con-
straint in (7) can be handed similarly), we note that the only
type of constraint that we need to encode into SAT is a con-
straint of the form 〈ai,xk〉 ≥ Ci ⇒ vi = 1. Moreover,
we recall that all values in ai’s are binary and xk is a bi-
nary vector. Let us consider the left part of (6) and rewrite it
using the summation operation:
∑nk
j=1 aijxkj ≥ Ci, where
aij is the (i, j)th entry in Ak and xkj is the j entry in xk.
Next, we perform a variable replacement where we replace
xkj ∈ {−1, 1} with a Boolean variable x(b)kj ∈ {0, 1}, with
xkj = 2x
(b)
kj
− 1. Then, we can rewrite the summation as,
nk∑
j=1
aij(2x
(b)
kj
− 1) ≥ Ci. (10)
Denote a+i = {j | aij = 1} and a−i = {j | aij = −1}.
Now (10) can be rewritten as:∑
j∈a+i
x(b)kj −
∑
j∈a−i
x(b)kj ≥ dCi/2 +
nk∑
j=1
aij/2e,
∑
j∈a+i
x(b)kj −
∑
j∈a−i
(1− x¯(b)kj ) ≥ C ′i,∑
j∈a+i
x(b)kj +
∑
j∈a−i
x¯(b)kj ≥ C ′i + |a−i |, (11)
where C ′i = dCi/2 +
∑nk
j=1 aij/2e. Let lkj = x(b)kj if j ∈
a+i and let lkj = x¯
(b)
kj
if j ∈ a−i . Let Di = C ′i + |a−i |.
Then (11) can be reexpressed as:
∑nk
j=1 lkj ≥ Di, which is
a cardinality constraint. We can rewrite the constraints in (6)
and (7) as:
nk∑
j=1
lkj ≥ Di ⇔ v(b)i = 1, i = 1, . . . , nk+1, (12)
where v(b)i ∈ {0, 1} is such that v(b)i ⇒ vi = 1 and
v¯(b)i ⇒ vi = −1. Notice that (12) is a cardinality constraint
conjoined with an equivalence constraint. Let SQ(lk, Di)
denote the sequential counter encoding of (12) as described
above with auxiliary variables ri(1,1) , . . . , ri(nk,Di) . Then,
ri(nk,Di) ⇔ v
(b)
i .
Putting everything together, we define the CNF formula
BINBLKk(xk,xk+1) for BLKk as:
nk+1∧
i=1
SQ(l, Di) ∧
nk+1∧
i=1
(
ri(nk,Di) ⇔ v
(b)
i
)
,
where the construction of the vector lk from the input vector
xk and the construction of the output vector xk+1 from v
(b)
i ’s
is as defined above.
Example 5. Consider the internal block from Example 3.
Following the above transformation, we can replace xk1 −
xk2 ≥ −1 ⇔ v(b)1 = 1 as follows 2x(b)k1 − 1 − (2x
(b)
k2
− 1) ≥
−1⇔ v(b)1 = 1.
Then we get x(b)k1 − x
(b)
k2
≥ −0.5⇔ v(b)1 = 1. This constraint
can be reexpressed as x(b)k1 + x¯
(b)
k2
≥ d0.5e ⇔ v(b)1 = 1, which
can be encoded using sequential counters.
Encoding of O. Consider the constraint in (8). We observe
that the same transformation that we developed for the in-
ternal block can be applied here too. We perform variable
substitutions, xdp = 2x
(b)
dp
− 1, where x(b)dp ∈ {0, 1} and
p ∈ {1, . . . , nd}. Let Eij = d(bj − bi +
∑nd
p=1 aip −∑nd
p=1 ajp)/2e. We can reexpress (8) as:∑
p∈a+i
x(b)dp −
∑
p∈a−i
x(b)dp −
∑
p∈a+j
x(b)dp +
∑
p∈a−j
x(b)dp ≥ Eij ,
where a+i = {p | aip = 1} and a−i = {p | aip = −1}, and
similarly a+j and a
−
j . We can simplify this equation where
each literal either occurs twice or cancels out as:∑
p∈a+i ∩a−j
x(b)dp −
∑
p∈a−i ∩a+j
x(b)dp ≥ dEij/2e.
The rest of the encoding of these constraints is similar to
BLK using sequential counters. This finishes the construc-
tion of BINO(xd, o).
Example 6. Consider the output block from Example 4.
Following the above transformation, we can replace xd1 −
xd2 ≥ d0.7/2e ⇔ d12 = 1 as follows 2x(b)d1 − 1 − (2x
(b)
d2
−
1) ≥ 1⇔ d12 = 1. Then we get x(b)d1 − x
(b)
d2
≥ 0.5⇔ d12 =
1. Finally, we rewrite as x(b)d1 + x¯
(b)
d2
≥ d1.5e ⇔ d12 = 1 and
can use sequential counters to encode the above expression.
5 Encoding of Properties
In this section, we use the encoding constructed in the pre-
vious section to investigate properties of BNNs defined in
Section 2. Note that since our encoding is exact, it allows us
to investigate properties of BNNs in the SAT domain. While
our encoding could be used to study any property on these
networks, in this paper, we primarily focus on the properties
defined in Section 2.
Verifying Adversarial Robustness. We need to encode
the norm restriction on the perturbation and the adversarial
condition. Consider an image x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a per-
turbed image x + τ , where τ = (τ1, . . . , τn). Our encoding
scheme works for any norm constraint that is a linear func-
tion of the input, which include the L1- and the L∞-norms.
As discussed in Section 2, the most common norm assump-
tion on τ is that of L∞-norm, that we focus on here.
Norm Constraint: For ‖τ‖∞ ≤ , we need to ensure that
τi ∈ [−, ] for all i ∈ [n], where n is the size of the images.
Note that τi is an integer variable as a valid image has inte-
ger values. Therefore, we can use the standard CNF conver-
sion from linear constraints over integers into Boolean vari-
ables and clauses (Tamura et al. 2009). Additionally, we add
a constraint to ensure that x+τ is a valid image. For this, we
make a natural assumption that exists a lower bound LB and
an upper bound UB such that all the entries in a valid image
lie within [LB,UB]. Then we add a constraint to ensure that
all the entries in x + τ lie within [LB,UB].
Adversarial Constraint: We recall that an encoding of a
BNN into SAT contains an integer output variable o. The
value of o is the predicted label. Hence, we just need to en-
code that o 6= `x into a Boolean formula, where `x is the true
label of x. We use CNF(•) to denote a standard conversion
of a constraint over integers into a Boolean formula. Putting
these together, checking robustness translates into checking
assignments for a formula BNNAd(x + τ, o, `x) defined as:
BNNAd(x + τ, o, `x) = CNF(‖τ‖∞ ≤ )∧ (13)
n∧
i=1
CNF((xi + τi) ∈ [LB,UB])∧
BNN(x + τ, o) ∧ CNF(o 6= lX).
We can further simplify this equation by noting that for ver-
ifying the adversarial robustness property, we do not need to
sort all outputs, but only need to ensure that lx is not the top
label in the ordering.
Verifying Universal Adversarial Robustness. This is
now a simple extension to (13) that verifies universal ad-
versarial robustness. For each xi ∈ S, we create a copy of
the adversarial robustness property encoding BNNAd(xi +
τ, oi, `xi), and verify if at least ρ-fraction of the inputs are
misclassified in S. This can be expressed as:
|S|∧
i=1
(BNNAd(xi + τ, oi, `xi)⇔ qj)∧
CNF(
|S|∑
i=1
qj ≥ ρ|S|).
Verifying Network Equivalence. To check the equiva-
lence between two networks BNN1 and BNN2 we need to
verify that these networks produce the same outputs on all
valid inputs x in the domain. Again assuming that each entry
in a valid image lies in the range [LB,UB], we can formulate
the network equivalence problem as the following decision
problem on variables x = (x1, . . . , xn).
∧ni=1 CNF(xi ∈ [LB,UB]) ∧ BNN1(x, o1)
∧ BNN2(x, o2) ∧ (o1 6= o2). (14)
If this formula is unsatisfiable then networks are equivalent.
Otherwise, a solution of the formula is a valid witness on
which these networks produce different outcomes.
6 Counterexample-Guided Search Procedure
Given the SAT formulas constructed in the previous section,
we could directly run a SAT solver on them to verify the
desired properties. However, the resulting encodings could
be large with large networks, making them hard to tackle
even for state-of-the-art SAT solvers. However, we can take
advantage of the modular structure of the network to speed-
up the search procedure. In particular, we use the idea of
counterexample-guided search that is extensively used in
formal verification (Clarke et al. 2003; McMillan 2005;
McMillan 2003).
Observe that the SAT encoding follows the modular struc-
ture of the network. Let us illustrate our approach with a sim-
ple network consisting of two internal blocks and an output
block as in Figure 1.4 Suppose we want to verify the adver-
sarial robustness property of the network (other properties
can be handled similarly). The network can be encoded as a
conjunction of two Boolean formulas: Gen (generator) that
encodes the first block of the network, and Ver (verifier) that
encodes the rest of the network. Therefore,
BNNAd(x + τ, o, `x) = Gen(x + τ,y) ∧Ver(y, z, o, `x),
where Gen(x + τ,y) = CNF(‖τ‖∞ ≤ )∧
∧ni=1 CNF((xi + τi) ∈ [LB,UB] ∧ BINBLK1(x + τ,y);
Ver(y, z, o, `x) = BINBLK2(y, z)∧
BINO(z, o) ∧ CNF(o 6= lX).
The generator and the verifier only share variables in y that
encode activations shared between Block 1 and Block 2 of
the network. The set of variables y is usually small com-
pared to all variables in the formula. We exploit this prop-
erty by using Craig interpolants to build an efficient search
procedure.
Definition 5 (Craig Interpolants). Let A and B be Boolean
formulas such that the formula A ∧ B is unsatisfiable.
Then there exists a formula I , called interpolant, such that
vars(I) = vars(A) ∩ vars(B), B ∧ I is unsatisfiable and
A ⇒ I . In general, there exist multiple interpolants for the
given A and B.
An interpolant can be obtained from a proof of unsatisfi-
ability of A ∧ B produced by a SAT solver (Pudlák 1997).
Note that there could be more than one interpolant I , and
depending on the technique used for constructing the inter-
polant, we could get different I’s.
Our search procedure first generates a satisfying assign-
ment to variables τ and y for the generator formula Gen(x+
4The approach easily extends to a general network were the par-
titioning can be applied after each block of layer.
τ,y). Let yˆ denote this assignment to y. Then we check if
we can extend the assignment y = yˆ to a satisfying assign-
ment for the verifier formula. If so, we found an adversarial
perturbation τ . Otherwise, we generate an interpolant I of
Gen(x + τ,y) ∧ Ver(y = yˆ, z, o, `x) by extracting an un-
satisfiable core of Ver(y = yˆ, z, o, `x) (Biere et al. 2009).
We use assumptions, which are assignments of yˆ, in the SAT
solver to obtain a core. Since none of the satisfying assign-
ments to I can be extended to a valid satisfying assignment
of BNNAd(x + τ, o, `x), we block them all in Gen by re-
defining: Gen := Gen ∧ ¬I . Then we repeat the procedure.
As we are reducing the solution space in each iteration, this
algorithm terminates. If the formula Gen(x+τ,y) becomes
unsatisfiable, then there is no valid perturbation τ , i.e., the
network is -robust on image x.
7 Related Work
With the wide spread success of deep neural network mod-
els, a new line of research on understanding neural net-
works has emerged that investigate a wide range of these
questions, from interpretability of deep neural networks
to verifying their properties (Pulina and Tacchella 2010;
Bastani et al. 2016; Huang et al. 2017; Katz et al. 2017;
Cheng, Nührenberg, and Ruess 2017a).
(Pulina and Tacchella 2010) encode a neural network with
sigmoid activation functions as a Boolean formula over lin-
ear constraints which has the same spirit as our MILP en-
coding. They use piecewise linear functions to approximate
non-linear activations. The main issue with their approach
is that of scalability as they can only verify properties on
small networks, e.g., 20 hidden neurons. Recently, (Bastani
et al. 2016) propose to use an LP solver to verify proper-
ties of a neural network. In particular, they show that the
robustness to adversarial perturbations can be encoded as a
system of constraints. For computational feasibility, the au-
thors propose an approximation of this constraint system to
a linear program. Our approach on the other hand is an exact
encoding that can be used to verify any property of a bina-
rized neural network, not just robustness. (Cheng, Nühren-
berg, and Ruess 2017a) propose using a MIP solver to verify
resilience properties of a neural network. They proposed a
number of encoding heuristics to scale the MIP solver and
demonstrated the effectiveness and scalability of their ap-
proach on several benchmark sets.
(Katz et al. 2017) consider neural networks with ReLU
activation functions and show that the Simplex algorithm
can be used to deal with them. The important property of
this method is that it works with a system of constraints di-
rectly rather than its approximation. However, the method is
tailored to the ReLU activation function. Scalability is also
a concern in this work as each ReLU introduces a branch-
ing choice (an SMT solver is used to handle branching). The
authors work with networks with 300 ReLUs in total and 7
inputs. Finally, (Huang et al. 2017) perform discretization of
real-valued inputs and use a counterexample-guided abstrac-
tion refinement procedure to search for adversarial perturba-
tions. The authors assume an existence of inverse functions
between layers to perform the abstraction refinement step.
Our method also utilizes a counterexample-guided search.
Solved instances (out of 200) Certifiably -robust
MNIST MNIST-rot MNIST-back-image
SAT ILP CEG SAT ILP CEG SAT ILP CEG SAT ILP CEG
#solved (t) #solved (t) #solved (t) #solved (t) #solved (t) #solved (t) #solved (t) #solved (t) #solved (t) # # #
 = 1 180 (77.3) 130 (31.5) 171 (34.1) 179 (57.4) 125 (10.9) 197 (13.5) 191 (18.3) 143 (40.8) 191 (12.8) 138 96 138
 = 3 187 (77.6) 148 (29.0) 181 (35.1) 193 (61.5) 155 (9.3) 198 (13.7) 107 (43.8) 67 (52.7) 119 (44.6) 20 5 21
 = 5 191 (79.5) 165 (29.1) 188 (36.3) 196(62.7) 170(11.3) 198(13.7) 104 (48.8) 70 (53.8) 116 (47.4) 3 – 4
Table 2: Results on MNIST, MNIST-rot and MNIST-back-image datasets.
However, as we consider blocks of layers rather than indi-
vidual layers we do not need an abstraction refinement step.
Also we use interpolants to guide the search procedure rather
than inverse functions.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, the MILP encod-
ing is the only complete search procedure for finding ad-
versarial perturbations previously proposed in the literature.
In our experiments, as a baseline, we use the ILP encod-
ing (described in Section 4), as it is a more efficient encod-
ing than MILP for BNNs. Most of the other existing ad-
versarial perturbation approaches are incomplete search pro-
cedures, and are either greedy-based, e.g., the fast gradient
method (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015), or tailored
to a particular class of non-linearity, e.g., ReLU (Katz et al.
2017).
(Cheng, Nührenberg, and Ruess 2017b) independently
proposed an encoding of BNNs into SAT. They used combi-
national miters as an intermediate representation. They also
used a counterexample-guided like search to scale the en-
coding along with a number of other optimizations 5.
8 Experimental Evaluation
We used the Torch machine learning framework to train
networks on a Titan Pascal X GPU. We trained networks
on the MNIST dataset (LeCun et al. 1998), and two mod-
ern variants of MNIST: the MNIST-rot and the MNIST-
back-image (Larochelle, Erhan, and Courville 2017). In the
MNIST-rot variation of the dataset, the digits were rotated
by an angle generated uniformly between 0 and 2pi radians.
In the MNIST-back-image variation of the dataset, a patch
from a black-and-white image was used as the background
for the digit image. In our experiments, we focused on the
important problem of checking adversarial robustness under
the L∞-norm.
We next describe our BNN architecture. Our network
consists of four internal blocks with each block containing a
linear layer (LIN) and a final output block. The linear layer
in the first block contains 200 neurons and the linear lay-
ers in other blocks contain 100 neurons. We use the batch
normalization (BN) and binarization (BIN) layers in each
block as detailed in Section 3. Also as mentioned earlier,
there is an additional hard tanh layer in each internal block
that is only used during training. To process the inputs, we
add two layers (BN and BIN) to the BNN, as the first two
layers in the network to perform binarization of the gray-
scale inputs. This simplifies the network architecture and re-
5This paper appeared on CoRR while the present paper was
under review.
duces the search space. This addition decreases the accuracy
of the original BNN network by less than one percent. The
accuracy of the resulting network on the MNIST, MNIST-
rot, and MNIST-back-image datasets were 95.7%, 71% and
70%, respectively.
To check for adversarial robustness, for each of the three
datasets, we randomly picked 20 images (from the test set)
that were correctly classified by the network for each of the
10 classes. This resulted in a set of 200 images for each
dataset that we consider for the remaining experiments. To
reduce the search space we first focus on important pixels
of an image as defined by the notion of saliency map (Si-
monyan, Vedaldi, and Zisserman 2014). In particular, we
first try to perturb the top 50% of highly salient pixels in
an image. If we cannot find a valid perturbation that leads
to misclassification among this set of pixels then we search
again over all pixels of the image. We experimented with
three different maximum perturbation values by varying
 ∈ {1, 3, 5}. The timeout is 300 seconds for each instance
to solve.
We compare three methods of searching for adversarial
perturbations. The first method is an ILP method where we
used the SCIP solver (Maher et al. 2017) on the ILP en-
coding of the problem (denoted ILP). The second method
is a pure SAT method, based on our proposed encoding,
where we used the Glucose SAT solver (Audemard and Si-
mon 2009) to solve the resulting encoding (denoted SAT).
For the third method, we used the same SAT encoding but
for speeding-up the search we utilized the counterexample-
guided search procedure described in Section 6. We use
the core produced by the verifier as an interpolant. We call
this method CEG. On average, our generated SAT formulas
contain about 1.4 million variables and 5 million clauses.
MNIST-rot generates the largest encoding with about 7 mil-
lion clauses on average, whereas, MNIST and MNIST-back
have about 5 and 3 million clauses on average, respectively.
The size of the encoding depends on network parameters
(e.g., the right hand side of cardinality constraints) and pixel
values as well. The largest instance contains about 3 million
variables and 12 million clauses.
Table 2 presents the results for different datasets. In each
column we show the number of instances solved by the cor-
responding method (#solved) out of the 200 selected in-
stances and the average time in seconds (t) to solve these
instances (within the 300 seconds timeout). Solved in this
context means that either we determine a valid perturbation
leading to misclassification of the image by the network,
or concretely establish that there exists no solution which
means that the network is -robust on this image. Figure 2
(a) MNIST,  = 1 (b) MNIST-rot,  = 1 (c) MNIST-back-image,  = 1
Figure 2: Results on MNIST, MNIST-rot and MNIST-back-image datasets with  = 1.
Figure 3: The original (the top row) and successfully perturbed (the bottom row) images.
compares performance of the algorithms for  = 1 using
cactus plots. Cactus plots for other values of  are similar.
It is clear that SAT and CEG methods outperform the
ILP approach. The ILP method solves up to 30% fewer
instances compared to SAT or CEG across all datasets. This
demonstrates the effectiveness of our SAT encoding com-
pared to the ILP encoding. Comparing the SAT and CEG
methods, we see that the results are mixed. On the MNIST-
rot and MNIST-back-image datasets CEG solves more in-
stances than SAT, while on the MNIST dataset we have the
opposite situation. We observe that CEG is faster compared
to SAT across all datasets. From cactus plots, it is clear that
CEG solves most of the instances faster than SAT. Gener-
ally, we noticed that the images in the MNIST-rot dataset
were easiest to perturb, whereas images in the MNIST-back-
image dataset were the hardest to perturb.
A major advantage of our complete search procedure is
that we can certify -robustness, in that there exists no ad-
versarial perturbation technique that can fool the network on
these images. Such guarantees cannot be provided by incom-
plete adversarial search algorithms previously considered
in the literature (Szegedy et al. 2014; Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard
2016). In the last three columns of Table 2, we present
the number of images in the MNIST-back-image dataset on
which the network is certifiably -robust as found by each
of the three methods. Again the SAT-based approaches out-
perform the ILP approach. With increasing , the number of
images on which the network is -robust decreases as the
adversary can leverage the larger  value to construct ad-
versarial images. This decrease is also reflected in Table 2
(Columns 7–9) in terms of the number of solved instances
which decreases from  = 3 to  = 1, as some of the in-
stances on which a lack of solution can be certified at  = 1
by a method cannot always be accomplished at  = 3 within
the given time limit.
Examples of Perturbed Images. Figure 3 shows examples
of original and successfully perturbed images generated by
our SAT method. We have two images from each dataset in
the table. As can be seen from these pictures, the differences
are sometime so small that original and perturbed images,
that they are indistinguishable for the human eye. These ex-
amples illustrate that it is essential that we use a certifiable
search procedure to ensure that a network is robust against
adversarial inputs.
9 Conclusion
We proposed an exact Boolean encoding of binarized neu-
ral networks that allows us to verify interesting properties
of these networks such as robustness and equivalence. We
further proposed a counterexample-guided search procedure
that leverages the modular structure of the underlying net-
work to speed-up the property verification. Our experiments
demonstrated feasibility of our approach on the MNIST and
its variant datasets. Our future work will focus on improving
the scalability of the proposed approach to enable property
verification of even larger neural networks by exploiting the
structure of the formula. We see two promising directions
here: (1) sharing variables between cardinality constraint en-
codings, and (2) using counterexample-guided search cuts
between multiple layers. Another interesting research direc-
tion is to consider more general classes of neural networks
that use a fixed number of bits to represent weights. In prin-
ciple, our approach can handle such networks but the scala-
bility issue is even more challenging there.
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